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 1 
Introduction 
 
 Technology is a vitally important aspect of the human condition.  
Technologies feed, clothe, and provide shelter for us; they transport, entertain, 
and heal us; they provide the bases of wealth and of leisure; they also pollute and 
kill.  For good or ill, they are woven inextricably into the fabric of our lives, from 
birth to death, at home, in school, in paid work.  Rich or poor, employed or non-
employed, woman or man, ‘black’ or ‘white’, north or south - all of our lives are 
intertwined with technologies, from simple tools to large technical systems.   
 When this intertwining is discussed in newspapers or other mass media, 
the dominant account of it can summed up as ‘technological determinism’.  
Technologies change, either because of scientific advance or following a logic of 
their own;  and they then have effects on society.  The development of computer 
technology, for example, is often seen as following trajectories that are close to 
natural laws, the most famous being Moore’s law, describing how the number of 
components on a state-of-the-art microchip doubles in a fixed, predictable period 
of time (originally a year; now 18 months).  This ‘defining rule of the modern 
world’ (Malone, 1995) fuels an information and communication technology 
revolution that, numerous pundits tell, is changing and will change the way we 
live. 
 
Technological Determinism as  a Theory of Society 
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 Technological determinism contains a partial truth.  Technology matters.  
It matters not just to the material condition of our lives and to our biological and 
physical environment - that much is obvious - but to the way we live together 
socially.  The historian Lynn White, for example, famously attributed the coming 
about of feudal society - a ‘society dominated by an aristocracy of warriors 
endowed with land’ (White 1978, 38) - to the invention, and diffusion to Western 
Europe, of the stirrup.  Prior to the stirrup, fighting on horseback was limited by 
the risk of falling off.  Swipe too vigorously with a sword, or lunge with a spear, 
and horse borne warriors could find themselves lying ignominiously in the dust.  
Because the stirrup offered riders a much more secure position on the horse, it 
‘effectively welded horse and rider into a single fighting unit capable of a 
violence without precedent’ (ibid., 2).  But the ‘mounted shock combat’ it made 
possible was an expensive as well as an effective way of doing battle.  It required 
extensive training, armour and war horses.  It could be sustained only by a re-
organisation of society designed specifically to support an élite of mounted 
warriors able and equipped to fight in this ‘new and highly specialized way’ 
(ibid., 38). 
 White’s account is better read as parable than as real history. 1  Amongst 
the Franks, the stirrup may have ‘caused’ feudalism.  But it had no such effect in, 
say, Anglo-Saxon England prior to the Norman Conquest.  To explain why the 
creation of a feudal system was attempted, and to explain why it was possible, 
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inevitably requires reference to a set of social conditions wider than military 
technology alone - the decline in European trade, which made land the only 
reliable source of wealth; the possibility (under some circumstances and not 
others) of seizing land for redistribution to feudal knights; and so on. As a simple 
cause-and-effect  theory of historical change, technological determinism is at best 
an oversimplification.  Changing technology will always be only one factor 
amongst many others: political, economic, cultural, and so on.  If technology’s 
physical and biological effects are complex and contested matters (and, for 
example, the literature on perceptions of risk strongly suggests this),2 it would 
clearly be foolish to expect its social effects to be any simpler.  A ‘hard’, simple 
cause-and-effect technological determinism is not a good candidate as a theory of 
social change. 
 However, the failure of a ‘hard’ technological determinism does not rule 
out a ‘soft’ determinism (Smith and Marx, 1994), and to say that technology’s 
social effects are complex and contingent is not to say that it has no social effects.  
That is our reason for beginning both this collection and its predecessor with the 
article by Langdon Winner.  His is one of the most thoughtful attempts to 
undermine the notion that technologies are in themselves neutral - that all that 
matters is the way societies choose to use them. Technologies, he argues, can be 
inherently political.  This is so, he says, in two senses.  First, technologies can be 
designed, consciously or unconsciously, to open certain social options and close 
others.  Thus, Winner claims, New York builder Robert Moses designed road 
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systems to facilitate the travel of certain types of people and to hinder that of 
others.  Second, Winner argues that not only can particular design features of 
technologies be political, but some technologies in their entirety are political.  
Even if it is mistaken to see technologies as requiring particular patterns of social 
relations to go along with them, some technologies are, in given social 
circumstances, more compatible with some social relations than with others.  
Hence, argues Winner, basing energy supply around nuclear technology that 
requires plutonium may enhance pressure for stronger state surveillance to 
prevent its theft, and thus erode traditional civil liberties.  The particular claim 
may be wrong - natural uranium shows no sign of running out, as it appeared it 
might when Winner wrote this article, and the relatively modest recycling of 
spent fuel has to date led to no restrictions on civil liberties - but the general form 
of the argument demands attention.  In adopting a technology, we may be opting 
for far more - economically, politically, even culturally, as well as technically - 
than appears at first sight.  Because ‘hard’ technological determinism is an 
oversimplified theory of technological change, discovering in advance what that 
‘more’ might be is very difficult, and predictions are, in consequence, often off-
beam.  But the difficulty of the task is not reason for avoiding it. 
 
Technological Determinism as a Theory of Technology 
 
 5 
 As a theory of society, then, technological determinism is asking a good 
question, albeit often providing an oversimplified answer.  Where we part 
company with it more decisively is in its aspect as a theory of technology,3 in its 
typical assumption that technological change is an independent factor, impacting 
on society from outside of society, so to speak. 
 This is a very common way of thinking, but to our minds a mistaken one.  
Most of the rest of this introductory essay - indeed most of the rest of this book - 
provides arguments and evidence for its mistakenness, but let us dwell for a 
moment on why the mistakenness matters.  The view that technology just 
changes, either following science or of its own accord, promotes a passive 
attitude to technological change.  It focuses our minds on how to  adapt to 
technological change, not on how to shape it.  It removes a vital aspect of how we 
live from the sphere of public discussion, choice, and politics.  Precisely because 
technological determinism is partly right as a theory of society (technology 
matters not just physically and biologically, but also matters to our human 
relations to each other) its deficiency as a theory of technology impoverishes the 
political life of our societies. 
 In one of the most influential recent works of social theory, for example, 
Ulrich Beck (1992) both diagnoses and calls for ‘reflexive modernisation’.  The 
apparently opaque phrase encodes several linked notions, but the one that is 
crucial here is the idea that instead of modernisation (‘progress’) being a process 
that just happens to societies it should become a process that is actively, and 
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democratically, shaped.  Beck’s work resonates with the remarkably successful 
attempt of the German Green Party to bring into the heart of the political process 
the activities and goals of citizen’s initiatives, of investigative journalists, of 
radical engineers, and of the environmentalist, women’s and peace movements.  
As a vitally important part of ‘progress’, technological change is a key aspect of 
what our societies need actively to shape, rather than passively to respond to.   
 Often efforts to develop a politics of technology are seen as anti-
technology, as an attempt to impose upon technology rigid, negative, political 
controls.  The prevalence of that misconception is our reason for including here 
an extract from the work of Donna Haraway, who has become perhaps the most 
influential feminist commentator on science and technology.  Her dense, playful,  
poetic, and occasionally oblique prose is sometimes misunderstood as an attack 
on science and technology, but we see it in a different light.  She is sharply 
critical of those who reject technology in favour of a return to a mythical natural 
state, and she argues instead for an embracing of the positive potential of science 
and technology.  Of course, there is much in those spheres she would wish to see 
change, but she eschews an ‘ecofeminist’ celebration of women’s spiritual 
closeness to an unpolluted nature.  Famously, and provocatively, preferring to be 
a ‘cyborg’ - a cybernetic organism, such as an animal with a human-made 
implant - than an ecofeminist ‘goddess’ (see Haraway 1985), Haraway is, in our 
reading of her, rephrasing an old theme: the liberatory potential of science and 
technology.  In the passage from her work we have selected, she notes the great 
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power of science and technology to create new meanings and new entities, to 
make new worlds.  While critical of many aspects of the way this happens, such 
as the wholesale extending of private property to - i.e. patenting - life forms, she 
warns against any purist rejection of the ‘unnatural’, hybrid, entities produced 
by biotechnology, admitting at one point (Haraway 1997, 89) her ‘frank pleasure’ 
at the introduction into tomatoes of a gene from flounders, which live in cold 
seas, that enables the tomato to produce a protein that slows freezing.  She revels 
in the very difficulty of predicting what technology’s effects will be.  The ‘lively, 
unfixed, and unfixing’ practices of science and technology produces ‘surprises 
[which] just might be good ones’ (ibid., 280), she comments. 
 
Does Science Shape Technology? 
 
 Clearly, any efficacious politics of technology—any systematic attempt to 
ensure that the surprises are indeed good ones—needs an understanding of 
technological change.  Let us begin to sketch an outline of such an understanding 
by tackling the most obvious force shaping technology: scientific change.  
Technology, it is often said, is applied science.  Scientists discover facts about 
reality, and technologists apply these facts to produce useful things.  As we have 
indicated, this view of technological change is a key underpinning of popular 
forms of technological determinism. 
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 There are several things wrong with the notion of technological change as 
the application of scientific discovery.  First, the notion of ‘discovery’—the 
uncovering of what is already there—is naive.  Scientists are, of course, in 
constant, intimate dialogue with the real, material world, but they are active 
participants in that dialogue, bringing to it conceptual schema, experimental 
traditions, intellectual investments, ways of understanding the world, models 
and metaphors—some drawn from the wider society—and so on (see, e.g., 
Shapin 1982, Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1997, Galison 1997). 
 Furthermore, science and technology have by no means always been 
closely connected activities. Looking backwards is tricky, because people in 
previous times did not operate with our notions of ‘science’ and ‘technology’ 
(Mayr 1976), and there is some controversy amongst historians who have 
studied the issue (see, for example, Musson and Robinson 1969, Mathias 
1972). But it can be concluded that before the latter part of the nineteenth 
century the contribution of activities we would now think of as science to 
what we would call technology was often marginal. The watermill, the 
plough, the spinning wheel, the spinning jenny, even the steam engine—these 
crucial inventions were in no real sense the application of pre-existing science 
(see, for example, Cardwell 1971 and 1972). Rhetoric about the contribution of 
science to technology there was in plenty, but the rhetoric often bore little 
relation to the modest reality of that contribution, and needs to be interpreted 
differently (Shapin 1972, 335-6). 
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 Where science and technology are connected, as they increasingly 
have been since the second half of the 19th century, it is mistaken to see the 
connection between them as one in which technology is one-sidedly 
dependent on science. Technology has arguably contributed as much to 
science as vice versa - think of the great dependence of science on the 
computer, without which some modern scientific specialties could scarcely 
have come into existence.4 Most importantly, where technology does draw on 
science the nature of that relation is not one of technologists passively 
deducing the ‘implications’ of a scientific advance.  Technology, as the word’s 
etymology reminds us,5 is knowledge as well as artifacts, and the knowledge 
deployed by engineers is far from just applied science, as engineer-turned-
historian Walter Vincenti (1990) demonstrates. Engineers use science. They 
seek from science resources to help them solve the problems they have, to 
achieve the goals towards which they are working. These problems and goals 
are at least as important in explaining what they do as the science that is 
available for them to use.6 
 
The Technological Shaping of Technology 
 
 If science does not in any simple sense shape technology, what of the 
notion that technological change follows an autonomous logic—the notion 
that technology shapes technology (see Ellul 1964, 85-94, Winner 1977, 57-73)? To 
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understand the force of this argument, it is necessary to see what is wrong 
with our common, but wholly mystified, notion of the heroic inventor. 
According to that notion, great inventions occur when, in a flash of genius, a 
radically new idea presents itself almost ready-formed in the inventor’s mind. 
This way of thinking is reinforced by popular histories of technology, in 
which to each device is attached a precise date and a particular man (few 
indeed are the women in the stereotyped lists) to whom the inspired 
invention ‘belongs’. 
 One important attack on this inspirational notion of invention was 
mounted by the group of American writers, most importantly William 
Ogburn, who from the 1920s onwards set themselves the task of constructing 
a sociology of technology (Westrum, 1991). In a 1922 article, Ogburn and his 
collaborator Dorothy Thomas argued that far from being the result of 
unpredictable flashes of inspiration, inventions were inevitable. Once the 
‘necessary constituent cultural elements’ are present—most importantly 
including component technologies—there is a sense in which an invention 
must occur. ‘Given the boat and the steam engine, is not the steamboat 
inevitable?’ asked Ogburn and Thomas (1922, 90.) They regarded it as crucial 
evidence for the inevitability of invention that a great many inventions were 
in fact made independently by more than one person. 
 Not the least of the difficulties in this position is that apparent 
inventions of the same thing turn out on closer inspection to be of 
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importantly different things (Constant 1978). A solidly based critique of the 
inspirational notion of invention can, however, be constructed directly, 
drawing on the work of writers such as Ogburn’s contemporary Usher (1954), 
his colleague Gilfillan (1935a and 1935b) and, more recently, historians of 
technology like Thomas P. Hughes (1971, 1983, and 1989; see also pp.xx-xx of 
this book). Hughes’s work is of particular relevance because much of it 
focuses on classic ‘great inventor’ figures such as Thomas Edison (credited 
with the invention of, amongst other things, the gramophone and the electric 
lightbulb) and Elmer Sperry (famed for his work on the gyrocompass and 
marine and aircraft automatic pilot). 
 Hughes has no interest in disparaging the achievements of those he 
writes about - indeed he has the greatest respect for them - but his work 
demonstrates that invention is not a matter of a sudden flash of inspiration 
from which a new device emerges ‘ready made’. Largely it is a matter of the 
minute and painstaking modification of existing technology. It is a creative 
and imaginative process, but that imagination lies above all in seeing ways in 
which existing devices can be improved, and in extending the scope of 
techniques successful in one area into new areas. 
 A vitally important type of technical change altogether escapes our 
conventional notion of ‘invention’. Technical change, in the words of Gilfillan 
(1935a, 5) is often ‘a perpetual accretion of little details . . . probably having 
neither beginning, completion nor definable limits’, a process Gilfillan saw at 
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work in the gradual evolution of the ship (1935b). The authors of this process 
are normally anonymous, certainly not ‘heroic inventor’ figures, and often 
skilled craft workers, without formal technical or scientific training; it is 
probably best seen as a process of collective learning rather than individual 
innovation. ‘Learning by doing’ in making things (Arrow 1962) and what 
Rosenberg (1982, 120-40) calls ‘learning by using’ - feedback from experience 
of use into both the design and way of operating things - are both of extreme 
practical importance. Individually small changes may add up to eventually 
considerable changes in design, productivity and effectiveness.   
 New technology, then, typically emerges not from flashes of 
disembodied inspiration but from existing technology, by a process of 
gradual change to, and new combinations of, that existing technology. Even 
what we might with some justification want to call revolutions in technology 
often turn out to have been long in the making. Constant’s important study 
(1980) of the change in aircraft propulsion from the propeller to the jet shows 
this clearly. Revolutionary as it was in the context of aircraft propulsion, the 
turbo jet built upon a long tradition of work in water and gas turbines. 
 Existing technology is thus, we would argue, an important 
precondition of new technology. It provides the basis of devices and 
techniques to be modified, and is a rich set of intellectual resources available 
for imaginative use in new settings.7 But is it the only force shaping new 
technology? We would say that it is not, and would argue that this can be 
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seen by examining the two most plausible attempts to claim that existing 
technology is more than just a precondition of new technology, but is an 
active shaping force in its development. These attempts focus around the 
ideas of technological ‘paradigm’ and technological ‘system’. 
 The idea of ‘technological paradigm’ (see Constant 1980, Dosi 1982) 
is an analogical extension of Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the scientific paradigm 
(1970). In Kuhn’s work, ‘paradigm’ has two main meanings, which are inter-
related but distinguishable. In the more basic sense, the paradigm is an 
exemplar, a particular scientific problem-solution that is accepted as 
successful and which becomes the basis for future work. Thus Newton’s 
explanation of the refraction of light, in terms of forces acting on the particles 
he believed light to consist in, formed a paradigm for much subsequent work 
in optics - researchers sought to produce similar explanations for other 
optical phenomena (Worrall 1982). The paradigm in this first sense of 
exemplar plays a crucial part in the paradigm in the second, more famous, 
wider sense of the ‘entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so 
on shared by the members of a given [scientific] community’ (Kuhn 1970, 
175). 
 The discussion of paradigms in technology has been less profound 
than it might have been because it (like extensions of Kuhn’s ideas to the 
social sciences) has tended to focus on the second meaning of paradigm, 
despite Kuhn’s explicit statement that the first meaning is ‘philosophically . . . 
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deeper’ (ibid.; see Barnes 1982, Gutting 1984, Laudan 1984). But there is no 
doubt that the concept of paradigm applied to technological change does 
point us towards important phenomena. Particular technical achievements 
have played a crucial role as exemplars, as models for further development 
(see Sahal 1981a and 1981b). In the field of missile technology, for example, 
the German V-2 missile played this role in early post-war American and 
Soviet missile development. Because technological knowledge cannot be 
reduced to a set of verbal rules, the presence of a concrete exemplar is a vital 
resource for thought. The Americans possessed actual German-built V-2s, as 
well as most of the design team; the Soviets painstakingly constructed, with 
help from some of the designers, replicas of the original missile (Ordway and 
Sharpe 1979). To a significant extent the V-2 formed the model from which 
further ballistic missiles were derived by conscious modification. 
 If we find technologists operating with a paradigm—taking one 
technical achievement and modelling future work on that achievement—it 
becomes tempting to treat this as somehow self-explaining and discuss it in 
terms of mechanical analogies such as following a technical ‘trajectory’ (Dosi 
1982). But to do this would be to miss perhaps the most fundamental point of 
Kuhn’s concept of paradigm: the paradigm is not a rule that can be followed 
mechanically, but a resource to be used. There will always be more than one 
way of using a resource, of developing the paradigm. Indeed groups of 
technologists in different circumstances often develop the same paradigm 
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differently. American and Soviet missile designers, for example developed 
significantly different missiles, despite their shared use of the V-2 as 
departure point (Holloway 1977 and 1982, Berman and Baker 1982). Where 
this does not happen, where there is congruity in the development and 
extension of a paradigm, this stands equally in need of explanation. 
 Just how much can be hidden by considering the further 
development of a paradigm as simply a ‘technological trajectory’ following 
an ‘internal logic’ emerges from another study by Hughes (1969). Here the 
‘trajectory’ being considered is that of successive processes for synthesising 
chemicals by ‘hydrogenation’—combination with hydrogen at high 
temperatures and pressures over catalysts. Hughes examines the trajectory of 
this work in the German chemical firm I. G. Farben and its predecessors. 
Beginning with the paradigm instance of the Haber-Bosch process for the 
synthesis of ammonia, the company moved on to the synthesis of wood 
alcohol and finally of gasoline (from coal). A ‘natural’ trajectory, indeed—but 
one that, Hughes shows, at each stage was conditioned by social factors 
inside and outside the firm, including, most consequentially, the German 
state’s need for wartime independence from external sources of raw 
materials. In America, the chemical giant Du Pont adopted synthetic 
processes for the production of ammonia and wood alcohol (Mueller 1964), 
but did not, in that very different environment, find the step to the synthesis 
of gasoline ‘natural’. In Germany, moving to gasoline synthesis involved 
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greater and greater links between Farben and the Nazi state, links which 
eventually led twenty-three executives of Farben to the dock in the 
Nuremburg War Crime tribunals. 
 The idea of technological system has been used in the history of 
technology more widely than that of technological paradigm, and thus the 
characteristics of explanations framed in its terms are more evident. We will 
follow its usage by Thomas Hughes, who makes it in many ways the central 
theme of his studies of technology. Typically, and increasingly, technologies 
come not in the form of separate, isolated devices but as part of a whole, as 
part of a system. An automatic washing machine, say, can work only if 
integrated into the systems of electricity supply, water supply and drainage. 
A missile, to take another example, is itself an ordered system of component 
parts—warhead, guidance, control, propulsion—and also part of a wider 
system of launch equipment and command and control networks. 
 The need for a part to integrate into the whole imposes major 
constraints on how that part should be designed. Edison, as Hughes shows in 
the extract below from his work, designed the light bulb not as an isolated 
device but as part of a system of electricity generation and distribution, and 
the needs of the system are clearly to be seen in the design of the bulb. 
Further, the integration of technologies into systems gives rise to a particular 
pattern of innovation that Hughes, using a military metaphor, describes as 
‘reverse salients’ (see, for example, Hughes 1971, 273 and 1983, 14; for related 
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observations see Rosenberg 1976, 111-12). The reverse salient is a product of 
uneven development. It is an area where the growth of technology is seen as 
lagging, like a military front line which has been pushed forward but where 
in one particular spot the enemy still holds out. Technologists focus inventive 
effort, like generals focus their forces, on the elimination of such reverse 
salients; a successful inventor or engineer defines the reverse salient as a set 
of ‘critical problems’ that, when solved, will correct the situation. A typical 
reverse salient appeared in the development of electricity supply systems. As 
transmission voltages were increased, power was lost between the lines 
through electric discharge. Because very high voltages were needed to 
transmit electricity over large distances, loss between the lines was a reverse 
salient that threatened the development of the electricity supply system as a 
whole. Consequently, considerable effort was devoted to solving the critical 
problems involved (Hughes 1976 and 1983). 
 The focusing of innovation on perceived reverse salients is a 
phenomenon of great generality. Hughes’s judgement is that ‘innumerable 
(probably most) inventions and technological developments result from 
efforts to correct reverse salients’ (1983, 80). While this is thus an important 
way in which technology (as technological systems) shapes technology, does 
it imply that only technology shapes technology? Hughes’s answer is ‘no’, 
and the reason for that answer is of considerable importance. A technological 
system like an electric light and power network is never merely technical; its 
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real-world functioning has technical, economic, organizational, political, and 
even cultural aspects.8 Of these aspects, the most obviously important one is 
economic, and it is to that we turn next. 
 
The economic shaping of technology 
 
 The very concept of ‘reverse salient’ makes sense only if a 
technological system is seen as oriented to a goal (Hughes 1983, 80). 
Otherwise, any metaphors of ‘advancing’ or of ‘backward’ parts become 
meaningless. Language of this kind is dangerous if it is allowed to slip 
towards vague talk of the ‘cultural need’ for a technology (Ogburn and 
Thornas 1922, 92), but the notion of a goal can be given a direct and down-to-
earth meaning. Most importantly, talk of a system goal is normally talk about 
economics, about reducing costs and increasing revenues.  Electricity supply 
systems, for example, have been private or public enterprises, and those who 
have run them have inevitably been concerned above all about costs, profits 
and losses. The reverse salient is an ‘inefficient or uneconomical component’ 
(Hughes 1983, 80), and for many practical purposes inefficient means 
uneconomical. 
 Technological reasoning and economic reasoning are often 
inseparable. Our extract from Hughes’s work demonstrates this in the case of 
Edison’s invention of the light bulb. Edison was quite consciously the 
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designer of a system. He intended to generate electricity, transmit it to 
consumers, and to sell them the apparatus they needed to make use of it. To 
do so successfully he had to keep his costs as low as possible—not merely 
because he and his financial backers wished for the largest possible profit, but 
because to survive at all electricity had to compete with the existing gas 
systems. Crucially, Edison believed he had to supply electric light at a cost at 
least as low as that at which gas light was supplied. These economic 
calculations entered directly into his work on the light bulb. A crucial system 
cost, a reverse salient, was the copper for the wires that conducted electricity. 
Less copper could be used if these wires had to carry less current. Simple but 
crucial science was available to him as a resource: Ohm’s and Joule's laws, 
from which he inferred that what was needed to keep the current low and the 
light supplied high was a light bulb filament with a high electrical resistance, 
and therefore with a relatively high voltage as compared to current. Having 
thus determined, economically as much as technologically, its necessary 
characteristics, finding the correct filament then became a matter of ‘hunt-
and-try’. 
 The precise characteristics of the Edison case are perhaps untypical. 
Even in his time Edison was unusual in his conscious, individual grasp of the 
nature of technological systems (therein, perhaps, lay his success), and since 
his time the inventor-entrepreneur has in many areas been overshadowed by 
the giant corporation with research and development facilities. Menlo Park, 
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Edison’s research and development institution, was only an aspect of the 
beginning of the great transformation brought about by the large scale, 
systematic harnessing of science and technology to corporate objectives 
(Noble 1977). But the essential point remains: typically, technological 
decisions are also economic decisions. 
 Paradoxically, then, the compelling nature of much technological 
change is best explained by seeing technology not as outside of society, as 
some versions of technological determinism would have it, but as inextricably 
part of society. If technological systems are economic enterprises, and if they 
are involved directly or indirectly in market competition, then technical 
change is forced on them. If they are to survive at all, much less to prosper, 
they cannot forever stand still. Technical change is made inevitable, and its 
nature and direction profoundly conditioned, by this. And when national 
economies are linked by a competitive world market, as they have been at 
least since the mid-nineteenth century, technical change outside a particular 
country can exert massive pressure for technical change inside it. 
 The dominant way of thinking about the connection between 
economics and technology is the ‘neoclassical’ approach, which is based upon 
the assumption that firms will choose the technique of production that offers 
the maximum possible rate of profit.  Despite its apparent plausibility, this 
assumption has been the subject of much criticism within economics. The 
issues involved are complex - there is a useful review of them in Elster (1983) 
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- but they hinge upon whether human decision-making does, or indeed 
could, conform to the strict requirements of the ‘neoclassical’ model. For 
example, how can a firm possibly know when it has found the technique of 
production that produces maximum profits? Is it not more reasonable to 
assume that a firm will consider only a very limited range from the set of 
possible options, and will be happy with a ‘satisfactory’ (and not necessarily 
maximum) profit rate? In the new approaches that have developed within 
economics, inspiration has been found in the work of Joseph Schumpeter 
(1934, 1939, 1943 and 1951), with its emphasis on the aspects of innovation 
that go beyond, and cannot be explained by, rational calculation.9 
 
Economic Shaping is Social Shaping 
 
 The ‘alternative’, non-neoclassical, economics of technology thus offers 
a direct bridge to more sociological explanations (MacKenzie 1996a, chapter 
3).  Costs and profits matter enormously, but in situations of technical 
innovation key factors are future costs and future profits.  Since there is an 
element of uncertainty in these, they cannot be taken as simple, given facts.  
Estimating costs and profits is part of what Law (1987) calls heterogeneous 
engineeering: engineering ‘social’ as well as ‘technical’ phenomena; 
constructing an environment in which favoured projects can be seen as 
viable.10 Market processes punish those who get this wrong and reward those 
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who get this right, but which outcome will prevail cannot be known with 
certainty in advance (see, e.g., Schon 1982).  Nor can it be assumed that 
market processes will eventually lead to optimal behaviour, as successful 
strategies are rewarded by the differential growth of firms that pursue them. 
That standard neoclassical argument may have validity for static 
environments, in which selection has a long time to exercise its effects, but not 
for situations of technological change.   A strategy that succeeds at one point 
in time fail shortly thereafter, and the market’s ‘invisible hand’ may simply 
have insufficient time for the neoclassical economist’s optimization to take 
place. 
 Furthermore, even if sure calculation of costs and profits—and even 
optimization—were possible, the economic shaping of technology would still 
be its social shaping.  Economic calculation and economic ‘laws’ are, after all, 
specific to particular forms of society, not universal, as Karl Marx famously 
argued (see, for example, Marx 1976, 173-6). Even if in all societies people 
have to try to reckon the costs and benefits of particular design decisions and 
technical choices, the form taken by that reckoning is importantly variable. 
  Consider, for example, technical innovation in the former Soviet 
Union. People there certainly made calculations as to what served their 
economic interests, and plant managers had greater autonomy to make 
decisions than is often assumed. But the framework of that calculation was 
different.  Prices were set by central planners of the State Price Committee, 
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rather than being subject to the vagaries of the market as in the West. A price, 
we might say, was thus a different social relation in the Soviet Union. In its 
classical form, the system of rewards to Soviet managers hinged upon 
quantity of production in the short run—fulfilling the ‘norms’ of the plan in 
the current quarter. The focus on quantity implied that while small 
technological innovations might be welcomed, larger changes (for example, 
changes that mean elaborate retooling) were a threat; developing a new 
product meant courting risks with little promise of more than commensurate 
reward if successful. The reforms that Soviet leaders introduced to alleviate 
this situation often made it worse. Thus economic reforms in 1965 tied the 
rewards to managers more closely to the profitability of their enterprises. But 
because the price system was not fundamentally changed, the greatest profits 
could be earned by concentrating on existing products whose costs of 
production had fallen well below their (bureaucratically set) prices. 
Innovation, instead of speeding up, actually slowed (Parrott 1983, 225-6), and 
the consequences contributed to the eventual dramatic collapse of the Soviet 
system. 
  Furthermore, even if we restrict our attention to societies in which 
prices reflect market competition, we find that economic calculation remains 
a mechanism of social shaping.  Economic calculation presupposes a structure 
of costs that is used as its basis. But a cost is not an isolated, arbitrary number 
of pounds or dollars. It can be affected by, and itself affect, the entire way a 
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society is organised. This point emerges most sharply when we consider the 
cost of labour, a vital issue in technical change, because much innovation is 
sponsored and justified on the grounds that it saves labour costs.  To take a 
classic example, because of the different circumstances of nineteenth-century 
British and American societies (such as the presence in the U.S. of a ‘frontier’ 
of agricultural land whose ownership by indigenous peoples was largely 
disregarded), labour cost more in America than in Britain. Hence, argued 
Habakkuk (1962), there was a much greater stimulus in America than in 
Britain to search for labour saving inventions, and thus a different pattern of 
technological change in the two societies. Habakkuk’s claim has in fact 
proven controversial (see Saul 1970 and Uselding 1977 for introductions to 
the controversy), but the general point remains: the way a society is 
organised, and its overall circumstances, affect its typical pattern of costs, and 
thus the nature of technological change within it.  
 That men are typically paid more than women, for example, is clearly 
not an arbitrary matter, but one that reflects deep-seated social assumptions 
and an entrenched division of labour, including unequal domestic and 
childrearing responsibilities.  The different costs of men’s and of women’s 
labour translates into diffferent economic thresholds for machines that have 
to justify their costs by elimination of men’s, or of women’s, tasks—a 
mechanism of the gendered shaping of technology that deserves systematic 
study (see Cowan 1979).   
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Technology  and the State 
 
 Social relations, then, affect technological change through the way that 
they shape the framework of market calculations. But the market is far from 
the only social institution that shapes technological change. 
 From antiquity onwards, states have sponsored and shaped 
technological projects, often projects on a vast scale. Lewis Mumford 
provided a classic account of this, and it is worth quoting from a short 
summary of his ideas (1964, 3): 
 
authoritarian technics . . . begins around the fourth millennium B.C. in a new 
configuration of technical invention, scientific observation, and centralized political 
control . . . . The new authoritarian technology was not limited by village custom or 
human sentiment: its herculean feats of mechanical organization rested on ruthless 
physical coercion, forced labour and slavery which brought into existence [human-
powered] machines that were capable of exerting thousands of horsepower. 
 
 Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European states were 
interested in technical progress, as a source of greater national power, 
population and treasure (Pacey 1976, 174-203). This ‘mercantilist’ framework 
carried different implications for the shaping of technology than did 
straightforwardly capitalist judgements. As Hafter (1979, 55-6) writes, ‘while 
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in England there was strong commitment to labor-saving devices, in France 
the mercantilist notion that work must be found for the largest number of 
hands prevailed’. As late as 1784, the brocade loom was praised in France 
because it ‘employed twice as many workers’ as the plain-cloth loom, it being 
argued that it was ‘the benefit of labor which remains in the towns when the 
products have left that is the real product of the manufactures’ (quoted, ibid., 
56). 
 The single most important way that the state has shaped technology 
has been through its sponsoring of military technology. War and its 
preparation have probably been on a par with economic considerations as 
factors in the history of technology. Like international economic competition, 
war and the threat of war act coercively to force technological change, with 
defeat the anticipated punishment for those who are left behind.11 Military 
technology is the subject of Part Four of this reader, and we need make only 
one point here, regarding the extent to which military concerns have shaped 
‘civilian’ technology. Military interest in new technology has often been 
crucial in overcoming what might otherwise have been insuperable economic 
barriers to its development and adoption, and military concerns have often 
shaped the development pattern and design details of new technologies. 
 Three cases in point are nuclear power, air transport and electronics. 
The initial work on the technology of nuclear energy was directly military in 
inspiration, and subsequently the economic drawbacks of nuclear power have 
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often been overridden by state interest in securing fissile material for atomic 
weapons and in gaining ‘autonomous’ national energy supplies. These state 
interests closely shaped reactor design, at least in the early years of nuclear 
energy (Gowing 1982, Rüdig 1983, Simpson 1983, Hecht 1998). Similarly, the 
civilian jet airliners of the post-war period were made possible by a 
generation of work on military jets, and Constant (1980, 166-7) argues that the 
design of 1930s’ British and German civil airliners reflected the ways in which 
those countries’ airlines were ‘chosen instruments’ of foreign and imperial 
policy.  Much of the development of electronics in this century has been 
sponsored by the military, especially in the United States. Military need and 
military support played a crucial role in the development of the digital 
computer (Goldstine 1972, Dinneen and Frick 1977, Flamm 1988, Edwards 
1996). Braun and MacDonald’s history (1978) shows the crucial role of 
military support in the development of semiconductor electronics (and thus 
in the origins of the microchip). That support was particularly important in 
the early phase of development when on most commercial criteria solid-state 
devices were inferior to existing valve technology. 
 
Case Studies of the Shaping of Technology 
  
Even in these cases of the shaping of technology by military interests, ‘shaping’ 
should not be understood as always being direct and conscious, as the simple 
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imprinting of human will on the material world.     What emerged, even in the 
cases just discussed, was by no means always what sponsors had intended: for 
example, though the military wanted miniaturization, their originally preferred 
approach was not the eventually successful integrated circuit.   Technologies 
(especially radically new technologies) typically emerge, or fail to emerge, from 
processes in which no one set of human actors plays a dominant role, and in 
which the role of a recalcitrant material world cannot be ignored.  The confused, 
unsuccessful, negotiation beautifully described by Latour (1996) is far more 
typical, even for state-sponsored technologies. 
 The social shaping of technology is, in almost all the cases we know of, a 
process in which there is no single dominant shaping force.  We have chosen as 
exemplary of this Paul Ceruzzi’s study of the emergence of personal computing 
(a phrase that includes not just the hardware necessary for personal computing, 
but also, for example, the software needed to make the hardware useful).   He 
eschews technological determinism, denying that the personal computer or 
personal computing were simply the outgrowth of changing microchip 
technology (while accepting that developments in that sphere were crucial).    
Members of the radical counterculture of the 1960s  and 1970s, Ceruzzi points 
out, wanted to liberate computing from its military and corporate masters: they 
were pursuing one version of the active politics of technology that we are 
recommending.  Author Ted Nelson, for example, combined technical and social 
radicalism, for instance in his influential proposal for ‘hypertext’ (designed to 
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help untrained people find their way through computer-held information 
organised in more complicated ways than in paper documents, and in one sense 
a precursor of the enormously successful World Wide Web: see Campbell-Kelly 
and Aspray, 1996).    
 This kind of countercultural impulse interacted with a largely male 
hobbyist culture, members of which simply wanted to have computers of their 
own to play with (part of the development of personal computing was starting to 
treat computers less seriously). The interaction was, for instance, at the heart of 
the Californian Homebrew Computer Club, which played an important role in 
the emergence of personal computing.   Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, founders 
of Apple Computer, famously started out making ‘blue boxes’ that mimicked 
telephone dial tones, allowing users to make free telephone calls, a laudable goal 
from a countercultural viewpoint.   However, Ceruzzi also shows other strands 
that came together in personal computing, notably the role of previous 
developments in time-sharing mainframe computers, such as the BASIC  
programming language developed for students (including humanities students, 
who were presumed to be less sophisticated technically) at Dartmouth College.     
 Personal computing was indeed socially shaped, but no one actor 
determined the shape it was to take, and the outcome was no simple reflection of 
an existing distribution of power. The mighty IBM Corp., which dominated the 
mainframe computer business, notoriously came to personal computing 
relatively late, and the field’s development was eventually seriously to weaken 
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IBM’s dominance. Orthodox corporate power has subsequently been 
reestablished in the form of the near monopoly of software supplier Microsoft 
(the early role of Microsoft’s founder, Bill Gates, is discussed by Ceruzzi) and 
microprocessor supplier Intel.   Nevertheless, the more pessimistic analyses of 
the development of word processing (Barker and Downing 1980) now seem wide 
of the mark, in part because some of the aspirations of the counterculture were 
fulfilled. The computer has indeed come ‘to the people’—not all the people, to be 
sure, but enough to make a difference.   
 Ceruzzi’s study is of the development of an entire field of technology. The 
other case-study we have selected for this introductory section is much narrower 
in its focus.  We have chosen it because it shows social shaping, not just of the 
overall contours of a technology, but of specific, apparently ‘purely technical’, 
features of technological designs, of engineering research, and even of 
mathematical models of artifacts. Eda Kranakis compares in detail two 
suspension bridge designs: one by the American, James Finley, inventor of the 
modern suspension bridge with a flat roadway; the other by Claude-Louis-
Marie-Henri Navier, a leading French engineer-scientist. Both Finley and Navier 
were heterogeneous engineers, but heterogeneous engineers working in very 
different environments with different goals. 
 Finley, working in the U.S. in the early 19th century, aimed at a relatively 
cheap bridge design that could fairly easily be tailored to a specific location by 
craftworkers with limited mathematical skills.  He wanted to make money not 
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primarily by building bridges himself but by getting others to pay to use his 
patented suspension bridge design. His design crystallized these goals. For 
example, Finley chose a sag/span ratio (see the figure on p. 000 below) between 
1/6 and 1/7, not because this was in any abstract sense optimal, but because this 
ratio greatly simplified the calculations that users of his patent had to make. 
 Navier, in contrast, positively sought sophistication in mathematical 
modelling. He was a salaried state employee, working in an engineering culture 
where mathematical competence was deliberately fostered and highly prized, 
and he was seeking promotion as a mathematical scientist as much as an 
engineer. Navier’s bridge was designed, both in its overall conception and in 
specific features, to demonstrate the applicability to technology of deductive 
mathematical reasoning. Kranakis suggests that the particular approach to 
mathematical modelling taken by Navier was influenced by his career goals, and 
reminds us that even mathematics is not always a universal language. For 
example, the French mathematical tradition in which Navier worked differed in 
its approach to the relevant part of mathematics—the calculus—from the 
approach taken in Britain. On the Continent, an algebraic, symbol-manipulating 
approach predominated, while many mathematicians in Britain clung to a visual, 
geometric version of the calculus, a preference that reflected the distinctive 
cultural and educational role of geometry as the paradigm of absolute 
knowledge, including theological knowledge (Richards 1979). 
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 Two crucial point about ‘the social shaping of technology’ can be seen in 
Kranakis’s study. First, she is perfectly well aware that bridges are real physical 
artifacts, and that their behaviour is in no way reducible to the ensemble of 
beliefs about them. Bridges built using Finley’s patent sometimes collapsed, and 
Navier’s bridge suffered a mishap during construction that opened the project 
up to eventually fatal criticism. The point is a general one: emphasis on the social 
shaping of technology is wholly compatible with a thoroughly realist, even a 
materialist, viewpoint. What is being shaped in the social shaping of artifacts is 
no mere thought-stuff, but obdurate physical reality. Indeed, the very materiality 
of machines is crucial to their social role, as part 2 of this reader emphasizes. In 
producing the first edition of this book, we chose the metaphor of ‘shaping’, 
rather than the more popular ‘social construction’, in part because the latter is 
too prone to the misconception that there was nothing real and obdurate about 
what was constructed. (One of the ordinary meanings of ‘construction’ implies 
falsehood, as in ‘the story he told me was a complete construction’. Although this 
is emphatically not what is implied when we or others have used the metaphor 
of ‘construction’, there is always the risk that this will colour how the metaphor 
is heard.) 
  The second point is that ‘social shaping’ does not necessarily involve 
reference to wider societal relations such as those of class, gender and ethnicity. 
These are sometimes directly crucial, and we give instances below of this, but 
often what is more immediately relevant are ‘local’ considerations, such as 
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engineers’ membership of professional communities, the reward structures of 
those communities, and so on.  These are social matters too.     The ‘social’ is not 
the same as what in old debates about the relationship between science and 
society used to be called ‘external factors’; social processes internal to scientific 
and technological communities are important too.  Often these internal processes 
are themselves conditioned by wider social and historical matters—for example, 
the reward structure of 19th century French engineering, with its distinctive 
emphasis on displays of mathematical competence, emerged out of the clashes of 
the Revolutionary period (Alder 1997)—but they remain social even when that is 
not the case. 
 
 The Path-Dependence of Technical Change 
 
We are aware that case-studies of social shaping are unlikely, on their own, to 
undermine the technologically determinist view of technological change.    In the 
long run, the convinced determinist might say, surely what matters is intrinsic 
technical efficiency: the intrinsically best technology will ultimately triumph, 
whatever local contingencies affect particular developments. 
 There are two answers to be given to this deep-seated determinist 
assumption. First, of course, is the basic point that the technology that is ‘best’ 
from one point of view is not necessarily best from another: what is best for 
workers may not be best from the point of view of their employers; what men 
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believe to be best may not be best for women, and so on. Throughout this reader, 
we will see examples of different assessments of what counts as technologically 
desirable. Second, however, is a subtle and important argument developed in 
our extract from the work of the economist Brian Arthur, an argument also taken 
up by the economic historian Paul David.12 
 Arthur’s point is a simple one, but broad in its implications. Technologies 
often manifest increasing returns to adoption. The processes of learning by doing 
and by using, discussed above, and the frequent focus of inventive effort on 
removing weak points (‘reverse salients’) from existing technologies, mean that 
the very process of adoption tends to improve the performance of those 
technologies that are adopted. This gives the history, especially the early history, 
of a technology considerable significance. Early adoptions, achieved for 
whatever reason, can build into what may become irreversible superiority over 
rivals, because success tends to breed success and rejection can turn into neglect 
and therefore permanent inferiority. The history of technology is a path-
dependent history, one in which past events exercise continuing influences. 
Which of two or more technologies eventually succeed is not determined by their 
intrinsic characteristics alone, but also by their histories of adoption.  The 
technology that triumphs is not necessarily abstractly best, even if there is 
consensus about what ‘best’ means.    Path-dependence means that local, short-
term contingencies can exercise lasting effects.13 
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 The history of personal computing, for example, is full of manifestations 
of path-dependence. The pervasive QWERTY keyboard, so-called because of the 
letters on the upper left, is in no sense demonstrably optimal. It developed to 
minimize the frequency with which keys in mechanical typewriters stuck 
together as a result of adjacent keys being hit in too close succession.  That 
rationale clearly became unnecessary after the development of electronic 
keyboards and wordprocessing, but proposals for alternate layouts are hopeless: 
the triumph of QWERTY has become in practice irreversible. It would, more 
generally, be hard to make a case for the intrinsic superiority of the technical 
system that has come to dominate personal computing: the combination of the 
IBM personal computer architecture, Microsoft’s MS-DOS and Windows 
operating systems, and the descendants of the Intel 8080 microprocessor. 
Historical contingency played a clear role in that outcome.   For example, in part 
because of a history of anti-trust litigation against IBM, the corporation was 
willing to license its architecture and permit others to manufacture clones, while 
its main rival, Apple, refused to do so; the consequence was an entrenchment of 
the IBM architecture, and the Intel microprocessors it employs, and the 
restriction of Apple to niche markets. 
 The issue of path-dependence needs to be analysed with some care, and 
some claims for the phenomenon have been criticized by Stan Liebowitz and 
Stephen Margolis (1990, 1995a, 1995b).  If a technology has an actually existing 
rival that is either demonstrably superior or can quickly and reliably be made so, 
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then lock-in to the inferior variant is, they argue, unlikely to be permanent. There 
are too many ways in which it can be overcome: for example, manufacturers can 
offer the ‘underdog’ technology initially below cost to create a market for it, or 
governments can subsidize it (this has historically been an important function of 
military expenditure, for example in helping solid-state electronics overcome its 
initial disadvantages, as noted above). Arthur is wrong to assert (p. 00 below) 
that the alternatives to QWERTY are superior; the evidence for that is at best 
ambiguous (Liebowitz and Margolis (1990). Whether Apple or IBM personal 
computers are best is a source of endless dispute, and other putative examples of 
lock-in to clearly inferior technologies are likewise controversial (see, e.g., the 
discussion of the popular example of VHS and Beta videorecorder formats in 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995a; for David’s reply to the overall critique, see David 
1997).  
 In, rightly, objecting to neoclassical confidence that the best technology 
will always triumph, Arthur may have bent the stick too far in the opposite 
direction in suggesting the likelihood of lock-in to the unequivocally inferior. 
Arguably, both sides in this debate underestimate the complexity and 
uncertainty of knowledge of the characteristics of technologies, even the most 
‘technical’ characteristics (MacKenzie 1996b).  Apparently easily answered 
questions about existing technologies, such as what keylay permits fastest typing 
or how accurate a given missile is (MacKenzie 1990), can turn out to be complex 
and contested.  Yet determining a single characteristic of an actually existing 
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technology is the simplest case: in real historical cases, those involved may have 
to weigh up the relative importance of differing characteristics (the efficiency of 
the internal combustion engine versus its potential for pollution, for example) 
and determine the likely effect of development efforts that have not yet taken 
place. 
 Complexity and uncertainty, however, increase rather than diminish the 
importance of path-dependence. If there is an unequivocally superior alternative 
to what historical processes of technological change have left us with, then, as 
noted above, there will often be reasons for modest confidence that it will be 
adopted. If, on the other hand, the characteristics of alternatives are uncertain 
and contested, then the low-risk course will be the path-dependent one of 
starting from what history has given us and seeking to improve it. 
 
Theorizing the Technology-Society Relationship 
 
A major development in the social studies of technology since the first, 1985, 
edition of this book, is the flowering of theoretical work on the relationship 
between technology and society. Two theoretical approaches, nascent in the mid-
1980s, have particularly close bearing upon the social shaping of technology. 
 First is the ‘social construction of technology’ perspective, developed by 
Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch, and represented here in a succint extract from the 
work of Pinch and his colleague Ronald Kline.   Its focus is on the very 
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phenomenon that has been underestimated in the debate over path-dependence: 
the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of technology.   Interpretative flexibility refers to 
the way in which different groups of people involved with a technology 
(different ‘relevant social groups’, in Bijker and Pinch’s technology) can have 
very different understandings of that technology, including different 
understandings of its technical characteristics. Bijker and Pinch’s focus is not just 
on the symbolic meaning of technologies (which in cases like motorcars or 
aircraft is subject to obvious social variation) but includes also variation in 
criteria for judging whether a technology ‘works’. 
 The Bijker/Pinch ‘social construction of technology’ approach draws 
heavily upon earlier work applying a sociological perspective to scientific 
knowledge. Those developing the sociology of scientific knowledge, such as 
Bloor (1976), sought symmetry of explanation.   Bloor argued against the then 
prevalent notion  that true scientific knowledge was the result simply of unaided 
human rationality and causal input from the material world.    Instead of 
invoking social processes only when the credibility of false belief had to be 
explained, Bloor argued that proper explanation of all knowledge, true and false, 
typically would involve recourse to material input, psychological processes and 
social processes. 
  There are few more difficult and more contentious topics than what 
sociology-of-knowledge ‘symmetry’ should be taken as meaning, and certainly 
not all subsequent authors employed the term in the way Bloor did. For Bijker 
 39 
and Pinch, symmetry means avoiding explaining the success or failure of 
technologies by whether or not they work. For them, ‘machines “work” because 
they have been accepted by relevant social groups’ (Bijker 1995, 270). To our 
minds, this formulation underplays the extent to which technology always 
involves interaction between human beings and the material world, but we 
wholeheartedly agree that historians and sociologists of technology should 
consider the fact that machines ‘work’ as something to be explained rather than 
taken for granted in our explanations. In particular, explanations of success and 
failure in terms of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of technologies are 
suspect because of the path-dependence of the history of technology. That one 
type of machine works better than the alternatives may reflect their histories of 
adoption and improvement rather than any intrinsic, unalterable features of the 
technologies involved. 
  The extract from Kline and Pinch’s article ends by citing some of the  
shortcomings of the approach originally taken by Pinch and Bijker. Of these, two 
are of particular relevance here. The first is the issue of structural exclusion. In 
their approach, the social groups relevant from the point of view of a particular 
technology are typically identified empirically:  in historical research, for 
example, ‘we can identify what social groups are relevant with respect to a 
specific artifact by noting all social groups mentioned in relation to that artifact 
in historical documents’ (Bijker 1995, 46). The trouble, of course, is that the 
exclusion of some social groups from the processes of technological development 
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may be such that they have no empirically discernible influence on it, and are 
not, for example, mentioned in documents concerning it: this, for instance, will 
often be the case with women, ethnic minorities and manual workers.14 It clearly 
would be most foolish to assume that gender is irrelevant to the development of 
a technology just because no women were directly involved and the masculinity 
of the men involved was never mentioned explicitly in discussion of it; and 
analogous points hold for class and, especially, ethnicity. The point is a difficult 
one—we would not claim to have a formula for how to analyse the effects on 
technological development of structural exclusion—but needs always to be kept 
in mind. The influence of ‘politics’ upon weapons technology, for example, is 
often indirect, manifesting itself in the efforts of technologists to keep their 
technologies ‘black boxes’, opaque to scrutiny from the political system, more 
than in compliance with explicit political demands (MacKenzie 1990). 
 The other problem with the original formulation of the Bijker/Pinch 
approach is one that also manifested itself in the first edition of this book: ‘the 
reciprocal relationship between artifacts and social groups’. The theoretical 
perspective that has done most to sensitize the field to this issue is what is often 
called actor-network theory, developed by scholars such as Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon, Madeleine Akrich and John Law, and represented here by the extract 
from the work of Latour and primatologist Shirley Strum. The key point can be 
conveyed by way of self-criticism. In the first edition of this reader, we largely 
thought of the social shaping of technology in terms of the influence of social 
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relations upon artifacts. The problem with this formulation is its neglect of the 
valid aspect of technological determinism: the influence of technology upon 
social relations. To put it in other, more accurate, words, it is mistaken to think of 
technology and society as separate spheres influencing each other: technology 
and society are mutually constitutive. 
 The reason why, from the varied and influential writings of Bruno Latour 
(see Latour 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996), we have chosen the article with Strum is that 
it reveals what the mutual constitution of technology and society means, and 
why it matters. Their starting-point is the developing appreciation in 
primatology (to which Strum’s field observations have contributed centrally) that 
primate societies—baboon societies in particular—cannot be thought of as 
having fixed social structures into which individuals simply fit. Primatologists 
increasingly see baboons as actively, continuously, negotiating and renegotiating 
their relative roles, and see social structure as the outcome of this process rather 
than as something fixed and given. 
 Primatologists, in other words, now view baboons very similarly to the 
way modern sociologists, following the decline of rigid views of social structure, 
see human actors as creating structure in and through interaction.   (The schools 
of sociology that have emphasized this are known as social interactionism and, 
especially, ethnomethodology.15)  Yet there is of course an evident difference 
between the societies that humans and baboons create: baboon societies are 
limited in time and space, essentially to the span of face-to-face interaction, while 
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human societies have histories and geographies that go far beyond that span. 
The difference is made, Strum and Latour argue, by the human use of ‘material 
resources and symbols’. It is the former that is of particular interest here. 
Material resources—artifacts and technologies, such as walls, prisons, weapons, 
writing, agriculture—are part of what makes large-scale society feasible. The 
technological, instead of being a sphere separate from society, is part of what 
makes society possible, in other words is constitutive of society. 
  To talk of ‘social relations’ as if they were independent of technology is 
therefore incorrect, Strum and Latour would argue.  Artifacts—things humans 
have made—are involved in most of the ways human beings relate to each other.   
Sexual acts (without prophylactics against disease or pregnancy) are one of the 
few exceptions in which humans interact, baboon-like, with our naked bodies 
and voices alone, and such exceptions are typically embedded in more material 
relations.  The point is not simply a pedantic  issue of choice of words, as a 
couple of examples of the technological transformation and creation of social 
relations may make clearer.  
 Consider first the Marxist accounts of technology discussed in part 2 of 
this book.   In essence, these suggest that production technology  ‘hardens’ 
earlier relations between workers and capitalists (relations that were closer to 
pure social relations, in other words not so strongly mediated by artifacts),  so 
strengthening the subordination of labour to capital.    The relation of labour to 
capital is not a social relation, Strum and Latour would point out, but a socio-
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technical relation; and in that respect it is typical. Second, consider the Internet, 
whose origins are discussed in part 4 below. One does not have to buy in to the 
hype surrounding the Internet to see that it permits the creation of new social 
groups by facilitating easy communication between geographically widely 
dispersed people with statistically unusual identities or interests. These newly 
created, or newly reinforced, groups can in their turn influence technological 
development.16 
 So we see Strum and Latour’s article, despite its apparently esoteric topic, 
as an ambitious critique of nearly all forms of existing social theory. Because 
these neglect technology, they implicitly conceive of society as if it were 
constructed by human beings using their voices and naked bodies alone: most 
social theory, in other words, is actually baboon theory!  This baboon theory 
cannot, Strum and Latour would point out, answer the fundamental questions of 
social theory—What is society? How is social order possible?—because 
satisfactory answers to them, in the case of human society, inevitably involve 
reference to technology.  This aspect of the actor-network position— that its  
fundamental contribution is to social theory, and not, in the first instance, to the 
sociology of science and technology, narrowly conceived—is often overlooked in 
debates about it in the literature of the latter field. 
 Both society and technology, actor-network theory proposes, are made of 
the same ‘stuff’: networks linking human beings and non-human entities 
(‘actors’, or, in some versions, ‘actants’). In this respect, actor-network theory 
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resembles Hughes’s technological systems perspective: a technological system 
such as an electric light and power network ties inextricably together both 
material artifacts and human beings—ties together ‘technology’, on the one 
hand, and economics, organization, politics and culture on the other. 
 Actor-network theory, however, differs from Hughes’s perspective in its 
much greater, ‘philosophical’, ambitions. These again hinge, to a considerable 
extent, on the treacherous term ‘symmetry’. Notoriously—this is the source of 
much of the controversy surrounding it—actor-network theory calls for 
symmetry in the analytical treatment of human and non-human actors (see, 
especially, Callon 1986;  for the main critique, see Collins and Yearley 1992).  We 
cannot discuss here the full range of issues this raises (for further discussion see 
MacKenzie 1996a), but can simply note that one version of the claim is wholly 
compatible with what we argue here:  that the material world is no simple 
reflection of human will, and that one cannot make sense of the history of 
technology if the material world is seen as  infinitely plastic and tractable.   
Whether its intractability is interpreted as agency (in the sense of intentionality) 
is of course another matter, one subject to wide cultural variation; but discussion 
of this would lead us too far away from the purposes of this volume. 
 
Constructing Gender; Constructing  ‘Colour’ 
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 One author sharply aware of the mutual constitution of society and 
technology is Cynthia Cockburn, and we reprint here her 1983 article ‘Caught in 
the Wheels’, which represents a pivotal point in the growing engagement 
between feminism and technology (for other work from the same period or just 
before, see Cowan 1979 and McGaw 1982). Cockburn went beyond concerns for 
‘equal opportunities’—greater representation of women in the traditionally male 
professions of science and engineering—to ask two further questions: is 
technology itself shaped by gender? and is gender shaped by technology? 
 Cockburn’s answer to the first of these questions is that ‘industrial, 
commercial, military technologies are masculine in a very historical and material 
sense’.  In part, this gendering arises because artifacts and forms of knowledge 
associated with women are often simply not regarded as ‘technology’. Ruth 
Schwartz Cowan, for example, noted in 1979 their exclusion from traditional 
history of technology: ‘The indices to the standard histories of technology ... do 
not contain a single reference, for example, to such a significant cultural artifact 
as the baby bottle. Here is a simple implement ... which has transformed a 
fundamental human experience for vast numbers of infants and mothers, and 
been one of the more controversial exports of Western technology to 
underdeveloped countries—yet it finds no place in our histories of technology’ 
(Cowan 1979, 52). 
 We explore the gendering of technology in several of the pieces in this 
volume and elsewhere (Wajcman 1991a). Here, what is more immediately 
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relevant—and is arguably Cockburn’s distinctive contribution to the debate 
around gender and technology—is her answer to the second question: is gender 
shaped by technology?   Technology, she argues, ‘is one of the formative 
processes of men’. The appropriation of technology by men, and the exclusion of 
women from many of the domains deemed technical, are processes that leave 
their mark in the very design of tasks and of machines, as Cockburn discusses in 
her article on typesetting in part 2 of this book. They are also part of the 
processes by which, in our society, gender is constituted. Different childhood 
socialization, different role models, different forms of schooling, gender 
segregation of occupations, different domestic responsibilities, and sometimes 
plain historical processes of expulsion (as after the First and Second World Wars: 
see Summerfield 1977 and Enloe 1983, chapter 7) have all contributed to what 
Cockburn describes elsewhere has ‘the construction of men as strong, manually 
able and technologically endowed, and women as physically and technically 
incompetent’ (1983, 203). 
  If gender and technology are mutually  constitutive, so are ethnicity and 
technology, though that is a topic that has been much less thoroughly explored 
in recent literature. The mutual constitution is most evident in relation to that 
commonplace marker of ethnicity: skin colour. We end part 1 of this book with 
an extract from the work of Richard Dyer, which  can be seen as suggesting two 
points. First, technology has been shaped by ethnicity, in that conventional 
valuations of skin colours have been the benchmark in the development of 
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photographic and film technologies: these typically are fine-tuned so that they 
provide pleasing renditions of ‘white’ faces, sometimes to the detriment of the 
reproduction of other skin colourations. Second, technology has helped 
constitute ethnicity, in that conventional hierarchies of desirability have been 
reinforced by the reproduction of ‘white’ faces as ‘pleasing flesh tones’ rather 
than (as often happened with ‘untuned’ photographic technologies) as 
unpleasantly ‘beefy’.
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1 The classic critique of White is Hilton and Sawyer (1963). 
2 See, e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Luhmann (1993), Adams (1995), Stern and Fineberg (1996). 
Woolgar (1991, 31-32) misunderstands our discussion of the physical and biological effects of technology 
in the introduction to the first edition of this book.  We do not suggest that, in his words, ‘some 
technnologies do in fact have self-evident attributes and capacities’; MacKenzie (1990, 1996a, and 1996b) 
argues the opposite, that knowedge of even the most ‘technical’ attributes of a technology can be analysed 
sociologically.  Our point is that the attributes and effects of all technologies are both socially negotiated 
and real (physical, material, biological).  An emphasis on the first does not imply indifference to the second.  
Were we to fall into the latter, we would indeed by guilty of the amoral and apolitical position attributed to 
students of ‘the social construction of technology’ by Winner (1993).  Both lay and professional perceptions 
of technological risk, for example, are shaped by social and psychological processes, but to assert this is not 
to deny (nor to be indifferent to) the possibility of real, material harm. 
3 We owe this useful way of formulating this key distinction to Edgerton (1993). 
4 For a material, even a technological, history of modern physics, see Galison (1997). 
5 ‘Technology’ is derived from the Greek techne, meaning art, craft, or skill, and logos, meaning word or 
knowledge.  The modern usage of ‘technology’ to include artifacts as well as knowledge of those artifacts is 
thus etymologically incorrect, but so entrenched that we have chosen not to resist it.  While our emphasis in 
this book is on the social shaping of artifacts, we are of course vitally interested in technological knowledge 
as well.  For an outline framework for the sociological analysis of this, see MacKenzie (1996b). 
6 See Barnes and Edge (1982, Part Three), Staudenmeier (1980, 1985), and the interesting studies by Aitken 
of the origins of the radio (1976) and by Cardwell of the development of the science of heat (1971). 
7 For two interesting and wide-ranging discussion of this, see Schon (1963) and Edge (1974-75). 
8 For the last of these, see Nye (1990). 
9 See, for example, Nelson and Winter (1974), Nelson, Winter and Schuette (1976), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Coombs et al. (1987), Dosi et al. (1990), Stoneman (1995).  The neoclassical model has also been 
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used by economic historians to explain choice of technology; see Sandberg (1969)), the review of the 
literature of Uselding (1977), and the critique of Sandberg by Lazonick (1981). 
10 See, for example, Gansler (1982); for an interesting and detailed discussion of the legitimatory role of 
cost estimates even in an ‘efficient’ project, see Sapolsky (1972, 160-91). 
11 It is worth rethinking the example of the stirrup and feudalism with this in mind.  Even if White is right in 
the overall features of his account, any causal effect of the stirrup comes not from technology as such but 
from military competition.  For it was surely military competition that, in White’s picture, propagated armed 
shock combat and the feudal system, as those societies that adopted them triumphed over those that did not. 
12 See, e.g., David (1992) and Arthur (1994). 
13 It is interesting to note the analogy that Arthur drew at the end of his article with problems in weather 
forecasting.  Implicitly, he was referring to theories of ‘chaos’, in advance of the wider vogue that the 
notion came to enjoy. 
14  See, in addition to the sources cited in the extract, Winner (1993). 
15 For an accessible introduction to ethnomethodology, particularly in its relations to more traditional 
sociology, see Heritage (1984). 
16In autumn 1994, an error was discovered in the implementation of floating-point division in Intel’s new 
Pentium™ processor. It was an error that would be triggered only rarely, and ‘bugs’ in early releases 
microprocessors are common events: previous generations of Intel chips had had similar errors without 
provoking much upset.   However, the divide bug was seized upon in the Internet news group, 
comp.sys.intel: examples of divisions that would trigger it circulated; material critical of Intel’s originally 
unalarmed response circulated widely; bad newspaper and television publicity followed. Intel had 
eventually to scrap existing stocks of the chip and offer users free replacements.  It had to set aside $475 
million to cover the costs of doing this. Subsequently, it has been making increasing use of formal, 
deductive techniques in chip development, techniques which are widely believed to offer the prospect of 
reduced risk of bugs. The role of comp.sys.intel, it seems to us, was as a ‘society’ bringing together people 
with an interest in the detailed behaviour of Intel chips. Without electronic communication, it is hard to 
imagine a sufficient critical mass of people coalescing around such an esoteric matter. 
